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Tired of Talking: A Call for Clear Strategies for 
Legal Education Reform:  
Moving Beyond the Discussion of Good Ideas to 
the Real Transformation of Law Schools 
 
Sara K. Rankin 
Legal education reform efforts have persisted for over one hundred 
years, supported by substantive expertise, empirical data, cutting-edge 
curricula, and effective pedagogy. But today, the normative face of legal 
education remains essentially unchanged. If the substance behind legal 
education reform is valid, then what is the problem? 
This article examines the stasis of legal education through the lens of 
historical reform efforts, political science, and contemporary 
organizational change theory. The author argues that legal education 
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reform efforts are marginalized and have limited normative impact because 
reformers underestimate the strategic demands of systemic change. As a 
result, reformers have yet to build a coherent, collective strategy for the 
transformation of legal education. The author contends that reformers must 
shift from an exclusive focus on the substance of legal education reform to 
adopt a new focus on strategy. Finally, the author offers some starting 
points on how to begin a new strategic discussion on the transformation of 
legal education. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
School reformers often reinvent the wheel with little or no 
knowledge that many of their practices have rich historical 
precedents.1 
 
[H]istory could provide direct solutions of sorts to present-day 
problems. At the least, it could keep us from repeating old 
mistakes.2 
The law is a creature of language.3 Legislators debate definitions and 
codify specific terms into law; lawyers search for nuances in statutes and 
contracts; judges construe precedential language and write new opinions 
that may be binding on future disputes. While most other professions are 
                                                            
1 SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, SCHOOLS OF TODAY: WHAT HAPPENED TO PROGRESSIVE 
EDUCATION (HISTORY OF SCHOOLS AND SCHOOLING V. 8) xvi (Susan F. Semel & Alan 
R. Sadovnik eds., 1999) [hereinafter SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW]. 
2 HERBERT M. KLIEBARD, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM, 1893–
1958, at 272 (3d ed. 2004). 
3 For further reading on the connection between law and language, consult LAWRENCE 
M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993) (survey of the impact of linguistics on 
judicial decision-making); PETER M. TIERSMA, LEGAL LANGUAGE (1999) (descriptive 
history of the development of legal language); STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY 
(2007) (pointing out the disconnect between context, legal language, and legal 
reasoning). 
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defined by products or services, the legal profession is uniquely defined by 
definition: the law is obsessed with words and their specific meaning. 
And yet, when it comes to legal pedagogy—how law students are taught 
to read, write, and communicate like a lawyer—law schools operate in a 
sort of rhetorical fog. Faculty can skillfully debate the specific meaning of a 
legal term or write lengthy analyses of a single case; but for most faculty, it 
remains a challenge to have a substantive discussion4 about transforming 
legal education. How do students learn? What should they learn? What are 
the best means to assess student progress? What are the implications for 
how we teach law? What are the implications for evaluating law faculty and 
law schools? For many law school faculty and administrators, these 
questions simply raise more questions. And so the rhetorical fog descends, 
ensuring stasis. 
The collective inability to define and refine effective legal pedagogy 
continues to impact the legal profession. A 2007 Carnegie Foundation 
Report underscored this failing when it announced that graduating lawyers 
are not practice-ready, that the legal community has become divorced from 
the communities it serves as the social and human dimension of the legal 
profession atrophies, and that this crisis affects us not only as individuals, 
but also as a larger society.5 The Carnegie Report’s sobering diagnosis 
                                                            
4 Substantive discussion is distinct from rhetoric. See infra Part IV(A)(2). See also 
MICHAEL FULLAN, THE NEW MEANING OF EDUCATIONAL CHANGE 354 (4th ed. 2007) 
[hereinafter FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE] (observing the “need to replace . . . 
Pollyanna-ish rhetoric with informed action.”). 
5 WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE 
PROFESSION OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT]; for extensive coverage of 
the Carnegie Report and other contemporary critiques of legal education, see ROY 
STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROAD MAP 
(1st ed. 2007) [hereinafter BEST PRACTICES]; AM. BAR ASS’N., LEGAL EDUCATION AND 
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK 
FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP (West 1992) 
(commonly referred to as the “MacCrate Report”); AM. BAR ASS’N., SECTION ON LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE OF LAW SCHOOLS (1979) 
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sparked an explosion of legal scholarship, adding to a compelling case for 
the need to reform legal education. 
Spurred by the Carnegie Report and the increasing economic pressure to 
produce “practice-ready” graduates,6 several law schools are hosting 
conferences on education reform, some are adopting terms such as “student-
centered” and “active listening” into their strategic plans, and still others are 
announcing more intensive reform measures.7 Various websites and blogs 
are now specifically devoted to innovation in legal education.8 Not to be 
                                                            
(commonly referred to as the “Cramton Report”). For summaries of these critiques, see 
Toni M. Fine, Reflections on U.S. Law Curricular Reform, 10 GERMAN L. J. 717, 718–28 
(2009); see also John Burwell Garvey & Anne F. Zinkin, Making Law Students Client-
Ready: A New Model in Legal Education, 1 DUKE F. FOR L. AND SOC. CHANGE 101, 
107–13 (2009). 
6 See, e.g., Lauren Carasik, Renaissance or Retrenchment: Legal Education at a 
Crossroads, 44 IND. L. REV. 735 (2011); Daniel Theis, Rethinking Legal Education in 
Hard Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 598 (2010). 
7 See, e.g., Garvey & Zinkin, supra note 5 (discussing the Daniel Webster Scholar 
Honors Program at Franklin Pierce Law Center); Message from the Dean: How we’re 
raising the bar, EARLE MACK SCH. OF LAW, DREXEL UNIV., 
http://earlemacklaw.drexel.edu/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2011); Justin Myers, Golden 
Gate University’s New 1L Curriculum, A PLACE TO DISCUSS BEST PRACTICES FOR 
LEGAL EDUCATION, ALBANY L. BLOGS (Dec. 18, 2009),  
http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2009/12/18/golden-gate-universitys-new-
1l-curriculum; Washington and Lee School of Law Announces Dramatic Third Year 
Reform, WASH. AND LEE SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 10, 2008),  
http://www.law.wlu.edu/news/storydetail.asp?id=376. For a survey of other reform 
efforts, see Fine, supra note 5, at 732–49. 
8 See generally A PLACE TO DISCUSS BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUC., ALBANY 
LAW BLOGS, http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/about/ (last visited Dec. 14, 
2011) (“This site was created with two goals in mind: 1) to create a useful web-based 
source of information on current reforms in legal education . . . [and] 2) to create a place 
where those interested in the future of legal education can freely exchange ideas, 
concerns, and opinions.”); Center for Engaged Learning in the Law (CELL), ELON UNIV. 
LAW SCH., http://www.elon.edu/e-web/law/cell (last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (“This site is 
intended to serve as a nexus for law teachers, students, administrators and practitioners to 
share different perspectives on how learning can be improved in law schools.”); Center 
for Legal Pedagogy, TEX. S. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,  
http://www.tsulaw.edu/centers/legal_pedagogy.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (“[T]he 
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outdone, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) law school accrediting 
body, the Council of the Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the 
Bar, began a comprehensive review of the ABA Standards and Rules of 
Procedure for the Approval of Law Schools in September of 2008.9 The 
section’s Standards Review Committee has been at the center of a 
maelstrom around reforms to accreditation that some predict could cause “a 
sea change” in legal education.10 Other examples of contemporary reform 
efforts are too numerous to survey in detail.11 
Given the Carnegie Report’s dire prognosis, the revived discussion about 
legal education reform is not surprising.12 What is surprising, or at the very 
                                                            
Center for Legal Pedagogy uses principles from the cognitive sciences about learning and 
discourse theory to study, implement, and evaluate law school teaching methodologies.”). 
9 The scope of the Standards Review Committee’s work is detailed at Standards Review 
Committee, A.B.A.,  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/committees/standards_review.html 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2011). Comments on the Standards Review Committee proposals are 
available on the ABA website, and also on SALT’s website at Liaison to the ABA 
Council and Standards Review, SALT, http://www.saltlaw.org/contents/view/319 (last 
visited Oct. 6, 2011). 
10 James Rodgers, Sweeping Accreditation Review May Prompt ‘Sea Change’ in Law 
School Evals, A.B.A. J. (Jun. 3, 2009), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/review_of_accreditation_standards_likely_to_br
ing_sea_change_to_how_law_sch. 
11 For example, the MacCrate Report pushed clinics from the margins closer to the 
mainstream of legal education. See, e.g., Russell Engler, The MacCrate Report Turns 10: 
Assessing its Impact and Identifying Gaps We Should Seek to Narrow, 8 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 109 (2001). Other resources, such as the AALS Sections on Teaching Methods, the 
AALS New Law Teachers Conference, and the Institute for Law School Teaching 
continue to impact pedagogical reform and to produce scholarship based upon sound 
learning theories. For more information on these programs, see Section on Teaching 
Methods, AALS, 
https://memberaccess.aals.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=ChpDetail&chp_cst_k
ey=7f6a02b7-e5a2-4d18-bfcd-d464ad64e42b (last visited Dec. 14, 2011); 2009 
Workshops, AALS, http://www.aals.org/events_2009nltprogram.php (last visited Mar. 
26, 2011); INSTITUTE FOR LAW SCHOOL TEACHING, http://lawteaching.org (last visited 
Mar. 2, 2011). Despite their impact, none of these efforts constitute systemic change. See 
infra notes 21–22. 
12 See, e.g., Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 
57, 59 (2009) (“Recent critiques [of legal education] have sharpened the current focus on 
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least, disappointing, is that the discussion is still mired in rhetoric13 and is 
woefully short on specifics.14 
This article contends that legal education reform efforts have limited 
normative impact because advocates tend to adopt a myopic focus on the 
substance of reform and underestimate the strategic demands of systemic 
change. As a result, reformers have yet to build a coherent, collective 
strategy to transform legal education. This deficit calls for a revision of 
focus: to invite systemic and lasting change, advocates must move beyond 
discussions of the substance of reform and adopt a new focus on strategy. 
This article also examines the persistent stasis of legal education through 
the lens of historical reform efforts, political science, and organizational 
change theory. Part II challenges the one-dimensional construction of 
reform as a change in product, content, or substance. Instead, for any 
substantive change to succeed, reformers must appreciate their task as a 
subversive, political, and strategic process. Part III compares contemporary 
legal education reform efforts to the progressive education movement, 
which began in the late nineteenth century. Part IV analyzes the reasons 
                                                            
legal education’s curricular deficits, and law schools have begun to respond with 
individual and collective reform efforts.”); THE INFILAW SYSTEM, http://infilaw.com (last 
visited Dec. 14, 2011) (a consortium of independent, community-based law schools, 
including Florida Coastal School of Law, Phoenix School of Law, and Charlotte School 
of Law) (“Its mission is to establish student-centered, ABA accredited law schools in 
underserved markets.”). 
13 See FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 354 (observing the “need to 
replace . . . Pollyanna-ish rhetoric with informed action.”). 
14 Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 12, at 59–60 (“Legal education may be at a crossroads, 
but diagnoses of its inadequacies far outpace our understanding of potential solutions.”); 
Andrea A. Curcio, Assessing Differently and Using Empirical Studies to See if it Makes a 
Difference: Can Law Schools Do it Better?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 899, 902 (2009) 
(“[T]he lack of a coherent structure and plan to teach and assess many of these practical 
skills and professionalism qualities is a central critique of the recent Carnegie Report on 
the Future of Legal Education and the Best Practices book.”); Ira P. Robbins, Best 
Practices on “Best Practices”: Legal Education and Beyond, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 
276 (2009) (criticizing Best Practices as “…suggesting mostly general, unmeasurable 
platitudes . . . appear[ing] to employ [best practices] to be all things to all people.”). 
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why progressive education reform efforts failed, highlighting a botched 
experiment at Columbia Law School in the 1920s. This section observes 
that progressive education reform failed in large part because reformers 
underestimated the strategic demands of change. Part V grafts this lesson 
onto contemporary reform efforts. The article concludes that in order to 
transform legal education on a normative level, reformers must become 
educated about the strategic and systemic challenges of effecting change; 
they must define clear, shared terms for the reform, and they must organize 
for collective action at the institutional, regional, and national level. The 
core thesis of this article is simple: like any epic battle, the transformation 
of legal education cannot be won on the basis of a righteous cause alone. 
II. LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM IS ABOUT PROCESS AND POWER (AS 
MUCH AS IT IS ABOUT SUBSTANCE) 
A reform is a correction of abuses; a revolution is a transfer of 
power.15 
Efforts to reform legal education are nothing new.16 Although reformers 
have been wrestling with the form of legal education for more than 140 
                                                            
15 Quote attributed to English statesman, Robert Bulwer-Lytton (1803–1873). SAMUEL 
ARTHUR BENT, SHORT SAYINGS OF GREAT MEN WITH HISTORICAL AND EXPLANATORY 
NOTES 363 (James R. Osgoode & Co. 1882). 
16 See generally LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE 
PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); REPORT 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAWYER COMPETENCY: THE ROLE 
OF LAW SCHOOLS, supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); BEST PRACTICES, supra 
note 5 (discussing contemporary pedagogical and curricular reform); CARNEGIE REPORT, 
supra note 5 (identifying areas for reform); Fine, supra note 5 (summarizing various 
reform efforts); Edward Rubin, What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method, and What to Do 
About it, 60 VAND. L. REV. 609 (2007) (reviewing the advent of the Langdellian method 
and alternative views of legal education). See also infra Part IV (discussing the Columbia 
reform experiment in the 1920s). 
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years, it essentially remains unchanged.17 Many factors contribute to the 
remarkable persistence of the traditional law school model, ranging from 
apathy, to inertia, to the common resolved belief that legal pedagogy does 
not need to change.18 But far more significant reasons for the stasis of legal 
education are often overlooked. 
One fundamental reason underlying the stasis is that reform is often 
narrowly understood as an effort to change content; in terms of education 
reform, this understanding translates into a myopic focus on changing 
curriculum or pedagogy. But this singular focus on content ignores the most 
                                                            
17 See generally Sandefur & Selbin, supra note 12, at 60; see also Rubin, supra note 16, 
at 612 (“We are trapped inside a pedagogical fossil, marvelously preserved from a 
vanished era by the adamantine rock of a licensed monopoly.”). 
18 See, e.g., CATHERINE L. CARPENTER ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N., REPORT OF THE 
OUTCOME MEASURES COMM. 61–72 (July 27, 2008), available at  
http://apps.americanbar.org/legaled/committees/subcomm/Outcome%20Measures%20Fin
al%20Report.pdf; Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking Legal Education, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 595, 597 (2008); Fine, supra note 5, at 729–32; Rubin, supra note 16, at 611–14; 
PAUL MAHARG, TRANSFORMING LEGAL EDUCATION 86 (2007) [hereinafter MAHARG, 
LEGAL EDUCATION]; Judith Welch Wegner, Symposium 2009: A Legal Education 
Prospectus: Law Schools & Emerging Frontiers, Reframing Legal Education’s “Wicked 
Problems,” 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 867, 867 (2009). For more on the dynamic of change 
(and the resistance to change) in the K–12 context, see DIANE RAVICH, THE DEATH AND 
LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM (2010); THE FOURTH WAY: THE 
INSPIRING FUTURE FOR EDUCATIONAL CHANGE (Andy Hargreaves & Dennis L. Shirley 
eds., 2009); TERRENCE E. DEAL & KENT D. PETERSON, SHAPING SCHOOL CULTURE: 
THE HEART OF LEADERSHIP (1999); ROBERT G. OWENS & THOMAS C. VALESKY, 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR IN EDUCATION: LEADERSHIP AND SCHOOL REFORM (10th 
ed. 2010); PHILLIP C. SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS: AN ACTION PLAN FOR 
EDUCATIONAL REFORM (2001) [hereinafter SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS]; 
FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 47–50; W. WARNER BURKE, 
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, A PROCESS OF LEARNING AND CHANGING 145 (2d ed. 
1994) (discussing individual concerns when faced with change) [hereinafter BURKE, 
ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT]. Indeed, the ABA Outcome Measure Committee’s 
recommendations for reform have been met with resistance. See Katherine Mangan, Law 
Schools Resist Proposal to Assess Them Based on What Students Learn, CHRON. OF 
HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 10, 2010), http://chronicle.com/article/Law-Schools-Resist-
Proposal-to/63494. 
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challenging task of education reform: systemic change also requires a 
subversion of power. 
Schools are “norming” institutions; they express and perpetuate the status 
quo.19 Dominant ideologies determine what schools teach and how they 
teach it. Education, in turn, shapes the ideologies of the future.20 Reform is 
an epic intervention in this cycle. 
As such, efforts to reform education are “inherently subversive.”21 
Reform is a struggle because it is an ideological battle, a contest to define 
and assert the dominant social ideology. Reformers cannot afford to 
envision their goal as simply one of content or substance. For any 
substantive change to succeed, reformers must also appreciate their task as a 
political process—a revolutionary undertaking. And no revolution, no 
matter how valid and compelling its basis, can succeed without a tactical 
plan. 
To advance legal education reform, advocates must prepare a strategy—a 
campaign—to ensure the acceptance and long-term viability of the reform. 
Reformers must try to articulate a coherent movement and create the 
necessary environment to secure a meaningful, enduring impact. Any other 
result is not true reform. That is not to say there is no cause for celebration 
in isolated or localized instances of success.22 But in terms of a normative 
                                                            
19 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 288. 
20 Id. at 274–75; Rubin, supra note 16, at 649. 
21 Alfie Kohn, Progressive Education: Why It’s Hard to Beat, But Also Hard to Find, 
INDEP. SCHOOL (Spring 2008), http://www.alfiekohn.org/teaching/progressive.htm 
[hereinafter Kohn, Progressive Education]. 
22 If we care about issues of access, we cannot be complacent with localized reform. See, 
e.g., SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that although progressive 
education schools had social-reconstructionist goals, they ironically “served a primarily 
affluent population.”). Moreover, marginalized reform will never impact how law schools 
are evaluated on a national or comparative level. In other words, isolated reforms will 
continue to be undervalued because they will be evaluated by a metric that is biased 
toward traditional schooling. Education reform requires systemic change. See FULLAN, 
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at xiii; BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, 
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discourse, such efforts will appear piecemeal and marginalized.23 Well-
intended efforts may be viewed in hindsight as a fad. For those who support 
reform, this would be a tragic result. 
III. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION AS 
PRECEDENT FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM 
EFFORTS 
The fate of the progressive education movement, dating back to the late 
nineteenth century, illustrates the toxic combination of a singular focus on 
substance and a failure to prepare for the political demands of change. The 
progressive education movement is a compelling case study of such a 
fatality because its theories and techniques are a primary instructional 
source for the development of contemporary legal education reform.24 
The discussion warrants a preface on the definition of “progressive 
education.” While historians continue to debate the definition of progressive 
education,25 “a common core of progressive education emerges, however 
hazily.”26 These common elements are largely associated with the 
influential American philosopher, John Dewey (1859–1952). Dewey’s 
                                                            
supra note 18, at 14; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at xvii, 
16. 
23 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 190 (“[E]fforts to reform legal education have 
been more piecemeal than comprehensive.”). 
24 Rubin, supra note 16, at 648. 
25 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 273; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[Progressive education’s] many 
often contradictory strands make it difficult to provide a capsule definition of progressive 
education.”). Daniel T. Rodgers referred to the elusive definition of the progressive era as 
“definitional wrangling.” Daniel T. Rodgers, In Search of Progressivism, REVIEWS IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 113, 114 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1982). Indeed, this “definitional 
wrangling” illustrates a key underlying premise of this article: to succeed on a normative 
level, reform efforts must establish shared definitions of key terms. See infra Part 
IV(A)(2). 
26 Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 1. 
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philosophy is covered in detail in numerous other works,27 including his 
own.28 This article attempts to summarize some of the elements of 
progressive education below, although such efforts to define progressive 
education are subject to an inherent tension.29 
One faces a similar challenge in locating a common phrase to describe 
our contemporary legal education reform efforts. Some refer to a “legal 
education renaissance,”30 while others invoke the rubric of “comprehensive 
law.”31 But these phrases are not clearly defined and it is difficult to discern 
their boundaries. 
                                                            
27 For further reading on John Dewey and progressive education, see LAWRENCE 
CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL (1961); THE ESSENTIAL DEWEY: 
VOLUMES 1 AND 2, (Larry Hickman & Thomas Alexander eds., 1998); KLIEBARD, supra 
note 2; ALFIE KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE: MOVING BEYOND 
TRADITIONAL CLASSROOMS AND “TOUGHER STANDARDS,” (1999) [hereinafter KOHN, 
THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE]; PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION FOR THE 1990S: 
TRANSFORMING PRACTICE (Kathe Jervis & Carol Montag eds., 1991); SCHOOLS OF 
TOMORROW, supra note 1; ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND THE AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY (1991); Lynn Olson, Dewey: The Progressive Era’s Misunderstood Giant, 
EDUC. WK., Apr. 1999, at 29. For detailed considerations of Deweyan theory and its 
potential application to the law school context, see Rubin, supra note 16, at 646–48; 
MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18. 
28 For a sampling of John Dewey’s own writings, see JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION (1916) [hereinafter DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION]; JOHN DEWEY, 
DEWEY ON EDUCATION (Martin Dworkin ed., 1959); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND 
EDUCATION (1938) [hereinafter DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION]. 
29 See KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 273; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 11; 
see also infra Part IV(A)(1) (discussing the debate about whether a coherent progressive 
era can or should be defined, especially Rodgers’s and Filene’s critique). 
30 John O. Sonsteng et al., A Legal Education Renaissance: A Practical Approach for the 
Twenty-First Century, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 303, 437–72 (2007). 
31 See Jess M. Krannich, James R. Holbrook, & Julie J. McAdams, Beyond “Thinking 
Like A Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward a Comprehensive View of 
Legal Education, 86 DEN. U. L. REV. 381, 400 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (citing 
Susan Daicoff, Law as Healing Profession: The Comprehensive Law Movement, 6 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L. J. 1, 3 (2006)) (“These common threads [of reform efforts] have led 
some commentators to refer to the changes cumulatively as the comprehensive law 
movement.”). 
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Although progressive education shares much in common with current 
reform efforts, it would be inappropriate to adopt “progressive” as a 
moniker for contemporary efforts. As explained below, progressive 
education reform suffered from many missteps, and the term carries its own 
baggage. Thus, articulated references to historical antecedents can easily 
become liabilities. Reformers must learn from the past but adapt for the 
future, so any reference for contemporary reform efforts should reflect its 
own unique visage. Perhaps as a not-so-subtle message of the need to 
clarify the terms of reform, this article occasionally uses the acronym 
“CLEAR” as shorthand for “contemporary legal education reform.” 
A. Progressive Education as “CLEAR” Precedent 
If one were to brainstorm key hallmarks of CLEAR, the resulting list 
would read like an executive summary of the hallmarks of progressive 
education from over one hundred years ago. Many of these theories are 
recursive and overlapping. These hallmarks include experiential learning, 
active learning, situated learning, differentiation, service learning, 
transformative education, collaborative learning, and interdisciplinary 
teaching. 
Experiential learning. Experiential philosophies hold that all theory 
derives from some concrete human experience or practice,32 so education 
needs the context of practical experience to restore a sense of purpose and 
the intrinsic motivation provided by a sense of purpose.33 Experiential 
learning is the centerpiece of progressive education. Indeed, Dewey’s 
seminal text, Experience and Education, provided the template for 
                                                            
32
 DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 28, at 169 (“An ounce of 
experience is better than a ton of theory simply because it is only in experience that any 
theory has vital and verifiable significance. . . . [A] theory apart from an experience 
cannot be definitely grasped even as a theory.”). 
33 Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 2; KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR 
CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 132–33. 
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contemporary understanding of situated learning, constructivism, and active 
learning.34 In legal education, we have approximated experiential learning 
to clinical teaching,35 apprenticeships,36 externships,37 class simulations, and 
role-plays. 
Active learning derives from constructivist theories that “knowledge is 
constructed rather than absorbed.”38 As the old proverb states, “Tell me and 
I forget, show me and I remember, involve me and I understand.” In 
contrast to passive learning in a straight lecture format, active learning often 
involves collaborative groups, student-generated classroom materials, and 
student-led presentations or discussions to develop higher-order thinking 
skills of analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.39 Students may be involved in 
curriculum design, class strategy, and peer or self-assessments.40 
Instructional emphasis is placed on students’ interaction with the 
                                                            
34 DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION, supra note 28. See also MAHARG, LEGAL 
EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 2–13 (reviewing Deweyan theories); SCHOOLS OF 
TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–9. 
35 See Stephen Ellman, The Clinical Year, 53 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 877 (2008–2009). 
36 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 27–29. 
37 For example, Northeastern University School of Law’s Co-op Legal Education 
Program integrates “four quarters of full-time employment” into the curriculum. Co-
operative Legal Education Program, NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, 
http://www.northeastern.edu/law/co-op/index.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2011). 
38 KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 132. 
Constructivism, situated learning, and other forms of social learning theories can be 
traced to the work of cognitive scientists Lev Vygotsky and Jean Piaget. See, e.g., LEV 
VYGOTSKY, MIND AND SOCIETY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 
(1978); JEAN PIAGET, THE ORIGINS OF INTELLIGENCE IN CHILDREN (1952). 
39 E.g., CHARLES C. BONWELL & JAMES A. EISON, ACTIVE LEARNING: CREATING 
EXCITEMENT IN THE CLASSROOM (1991) (discussing a variety of strategies to support 
active learning). 
40 Kohn, Progressive Education, supra note 21, at 2–3 (“Naturally, teachers will have 
broadly conceived themes and objectives in mind but they don’t just design a course of 
study for their students; they design it with them, and they welcome unexpected 
detours.”) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, teachers must be “comfortable with 
uncertainty” and be willing to “give up some control and let students take some 
ownership, which requires guts as well as talent.” Id. at 5. See also SCHLECHTY, 
INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 42–60. 
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environment, reflection, and the engagement of student attitudes and values. 
Educational theorists and cognitive scientists report that active learning 
results in higher student motivation, satisfaction, and performance.41 
Situated or “real world” learning. Situated learning techniques seek to 
create an educational context that is as close as possible to the real world 
environment in which the learned skills are applied.42 In other words, 
education should happen in a context that reflects the messiness and 
complexity of actual practice.43 The objective of situated learning is the 
development of sophisticated analytical ability and judgment that cannot be 
replicated in a theoretical context. 44 Situated learning is often referred to as 
problem-solving or problem-based learning.45 Such experiences are “not 
separated from the noise, confusion, and group interactions prevalent in real 
work environments.”46 In legal education, clinical programs typically rely 
on a combination of experiential, active, and situated learning.47 
                                                            
41 See, e.g., LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND ET AL., POWERFUL LEARNING: WHAT WE 
KNOW ABOUT TEACHING FOR UNDERSTANDING (2008); Kohn, Progressive Education, 
supra note 21, at 2. 
42 JEAN LAVE & ETIENNE WENGER, SITUATED LEARNING: LEGITIMATE PERIPHERAL 
PARTICIPATION (1991). See also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 173 (“The 
interdependence of knowledge, skill, and sense of purpose . . . is difficult to teach or 
assess through the usual academic techniques, which focus on procedures and techniques 
out of context. . . . Practical judgment depends on complex traditions of living, which can 
only come alive through apprenticeship experiences.”). 
43 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 188 (criticizing law schools as paying “casual 
attention . . . to teaching students how to use legal thinking in the complexity of actual 
legal practice.”). 
44 See Deborah Rhode, Legal Ethics in Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV. 43, 43, 51 
(2009) (describing the role of experience and clinical education in the development of 
“reflective judgment”); Rubin, supra note 16, at 639 (“[S]tudents of politics learned . . . 
that the real world, and not a library, is the true laboratory of the human sciences. Legal 
academics needed another seventy years or so to learn this, and they have not yet applied 
those lessons to the law school curriculum.”). 
45 MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 38–42; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, 
supra note 1, at 8. 
46 David Stein, Situated Learning in Adult Education, ERIC DIGEST NO. 195, at 2, 
available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED418250.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2011). 
47 See, e.g., Ellman, supra note 35, at 884–90. 
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Interdisciplinary teaching. Interdisciplinary teaching has been 
described as “an implementation of transactional realism.”48 The concept is 
a sort of “curriculum integration”49 across several disciplines.50 A team of 
teachers (each specializing in a different content area) might teach a single 
group of students, who are then asked to correlate or draw thematic 
connections. Or a single teacher might teach a unit across various 
disciplines with some organizing theme. Many law schools offer an array of 
interdisciplinary courses, such as law and business school combinations, 
law and social science classes, and jurisprudence courses.51 Interdisciplinary 
legal ethics classes are increasingly common in law schools and 
universities.52 Other interdisciplinary efforts, such as Writing Across the 
Curriculum,53 are also gaining popularity in legal education. 
Collaborative, cooperative, or group learning. In contrast to traditional 
schooling, which requires the student to operate primarily or exclusively as 
an individual, collaborative learning requires students to work 
                                                            
48 MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 14. Maharg’s text is an ambitious 
examination of interdisciplinarity and other progressive methods in the law school 
context. 
49 The phrase “curriculum integration” was coined by education scholar Dr. James A. 
Beane. JAMES A. BEANE, CURRICULUM INTEGRATION: DESIGNING THE CORE OF 
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1997). 
50 See generally INTERDISCIPLINARY CURRICULUM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
(Heidi Hayes Jacobs ed., 1989). 
51 Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 597 (“[L]aw is inherently interdisciplinary and must 
be shaped by understanding fields such as economics, philosophy, and psychology.”). 
52 E.g., Center for Ethics & Public Service, UNIV. OF MIAMI SCH. OF L., 
http://www.law.miami.edu/ceps (last visited Mar. 26, 2011); Theresa Johnston, 
Transforming Legal Education, STANFORD LAWYER, Fall 2008, at 14, available at 
http://stanfordlawyer.law.stanford.edu/issues/75/sl75_articles.pdf (discussing reform 
interest and activity at Stanford, including interdisciplinary study programs). 
53 Pamela Lysaght & Cristina D. Lockwood, Writing Across the Curriculum, Theoretical 
Justifications, Curricular Implications, 2 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 73 
(2004). 
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interdependently towards both personal and team goals.54 The learning 
environment stresses an interactive dynamic among multiple learners.55 
Students must learn to work as a team, enduring the various stages of group 
formation and growth56 in order to work effectively. Cooperative learning 
techniques appeal to the social reality of legal practice, which involves 
clients, opposing counsel, teamwork, and other complex social dynamics.57 
Differentiation. Differentiation involves curricular and pedagogical 
adaptations for students’ different learning styles and experiences.58 
Differentiation is a natural outgrowth of constructivist theories,59 which 
                                                            
54 Clifford S. Zimmerman, “Thinking Beyond my own Interpretation:” Reflections on 
Collaborative and Cooperative Learning Theory in the Law School Curriculum, 31 ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. 957, 995, 1000 (1999). 
55 Id. at 1008. 
56 Many contemporary articulations of group formation dynamics are attributed to Bruce 
Tuckman. See Bruce Tuckman, Developmental Sequence in Small Groups, GROUP 
FACILITATION, Spring 2001, available at  
http://openvce.net/sites/default/files/Tuckman1965DevelopmentalSequence.pdf. 
57 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 199–221 (discussing the benefits of collaborative 
learning). See also MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 83 (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953 (J.A. 
Boydston ed., 1981)) (“[L]aw is through and through a social phenomenon; social in 
origin, in purpose or end [and an] inter-activity[, . . . which] can be discussed only in 
terms of the social conditions in which it arises and of what it concretely does there.”). 
58 HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 91, 150–55 (2000). See generally Robin Boyle & Lynn Dolle, Providing 
Structure to Law Students: Introducing the Programmed Learning Sequence as an 
Instructional Tool, 8 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 59 (2002); Paula 
Lustbader, Walk the Talk: Creating Learning Communities to Promote a Pedagogy of 
Justice, 4 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 613 (2006). 
59 Constructivism is a very broad conceptual framework in cognitive science and is 
generally attributed to Jean Piaget, Lev Vygotsky, and Jerome Bruner. See, e.g., JEROME 
BRUNER, THE PROCESS OF EDUCATION (1977); JEAN PIAGET, TO UNDERSTAND IS TO 
INVENT: THE FUTURE OF EDUCATION (1973); VYGOTSKY, supra note 38. However, the 
roots of constructivist theory incorporated Dewey’s philosophies, including those 
articulated in Democracy and Education, published in 1916. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND 
EDUCATION, supra note 28. See also Jong Suk Kim, The Effects of a Constructivist 
Teaching Approach on Student Academic Achievement, Self-Concept, and Learning 
Strategies, 6 ASIA PAC. EDUC. REV. 7 (2005) (reviewing Deweyan and constructivist 
theories). 
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hold that the learner brings a unique background and perspective to any 
learning environment, creating a unique dialectic.60 In legal education, 
differentiation remains a controversial topic but has gained popularity in 
contemporary reform efforts. Some educators cast differentiation as a means 
to achieve “inclusive” education, reaching diverse populations and learning 
styles.61 
Transformative goals. Dewey believed that a primary function of school 
was to prepare students for meaningful participation in society.62 Education 
influences the development of our individual and collective values, ethics, 
and identity.63 Therefore, progressive schools openly sought to facilitate 
individual and social change through student development.64 The Carnegie 
Report stressed a similar “transformative” potential for legal education.65 
Transformative values are sometimes expressed in law school curricula or 
institutional messaging: commitments to difference and diversity, social 
justice, international law specialties, and pro bono clinics are a few 
examples.66 The transformative potential of legal ethics programming—and 
the impact on students’ ethical identities—is at the core of current debate.67 
                                                            
60 GARDNER, supra note 58, at 150–55; see also Paul Maharg, Rogers, Constructivism 
and Jurisprudence: Educational Critique and the Legal Curriculum, 7 INT’L J. L. PROF. 
189, 194–96 (2008). See generally Kristen Dauphinais, Valuing and Nurturing Multiple 
Intelligences in Legal Education: A Paradigm Shift, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC 
ANC. L.J. 1 (2005). 
61 See, e.g., Lustbader, supra note 58. 
62 See generally DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 28; JOHN DEWEY, 
THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY & THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM (2001). See also 
SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
63 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 28; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 51–53. 
64 SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–8, 367. 
65 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 138–40. 
66 For more on the transformative potential of law school, see Krannich, Holbrook & 
McAdams, supra note 31; Anthony Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1073, 
1083–86 (2009) (discussing the Carnegie Report and “pedagogical transformation”). 
67 See generally Rhode, supra note 44; Michael Robertson, Providing Ethics Learning 
Opportunities throughout the Legal Curriculum, 12 LEGAL ETHICS 59 (2009). 
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Community service. One means of transformative education is public or 
community service. Dewey envisioned an integration of the school, the 
individual, and the individual’s surrounding community.68 For Dewey, the 
individual’s participation in a democratic society placed civic engagement 
at the core of progressive pedagogy.69 Today, community service has an 
increasing role in higher education,70 including law schools.71 The rationale 
for community service in legal education includes the value to society, as 
well as the ethical and moral development of the student.72 In law school, 
community service often entails clinical work, marrying the value of 
experiential learning with the fulfillment of ethical obligations to society. 
Alternative methods of assessment. Alternative student assessments 
reflect the progressive philosophy that true knowledge is not amenable to 
quantitative measurement; instead, the focus should be on qualitative 
reflections of student understanding and experience.73 Progressive schools 
resist summative, grade-based student evaluations in favor of formative, 
                                                            
68 SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 5–7. 
69 Id. at 375–76. 
70 See generally ANNE COLBY ET AL., EDUCATING CITIZENS: PREPARING AMERICA’S 
UNDERGRADUATES FOR LIVES OF MORAL AND CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY (1st ed. 2003). 
For an interesting read on the role community service could play in faculty promotion 
and tenure, see Julie Ellison & Timothy K. Eatman, Scholarship in Public: Knowledge 
Creation and Tenure Policy in the Engaged University, A Resource on Promotion and 
Tenure in the Arts, Humanities, and Design, in IMAGINING AMERICA: ARTISTS AND 
SCHOLARS IN PUBLIC LIFE TENURE TEAM INITIATIVE ON PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP (2008), 
available at http://ase.tufts.edu/macc/documents/ScholarshipPublic.pdf.  
71 Today, at least thirty-six law schools require noncredit hours of pro bono, community 
service, or public service as a graduation requirement. Standing Committee on Pro Bono 
and Public Service and the Center for Pro Bono, AM. BAR ASS’N. (June 24, 2011), 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/lawschools/pb_programs_chart.html#gradu
ation_requirement. 
72 CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 5, at 21–22, 138–39, 176–80, 183–84 (discussing the 
importance of teaching and supporting the development of ethical, moral, and social 
responsibility in legal education). 
73 Id. at 32–33, 41–42, 194–95; HOLDING VALUES: WHAT WE MEAN BY PROGRESSIVE 
EDUCATION 176–81 (Brenda S. Engel and Anne C. Martin eds., Heinman 2005); KOHN, 
THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 21, 25–40, 196–97. 
Tired of Talking 29 
VOLUME 10 • ISSUE 1 • 2011 
portfolio evaluations.74 Emphasis is placed on student self-evaluation.75 
Alternative assessments also remove motivational barriers that compel 
students to focus on “how well they’re doing” instead of “what they’re 
doing.”76 Alternative methods of assessment can relate to student evaluation 
(summative or formative),77 teacher evaluation,78 as well as the evaluation 
and ranking of the educational institution itself.79 The redefinition of 
outcomes and assessments is an increasingly active topic in the law school 
context.80 
But law schools cannot measure what they do not teach.81 Therefore, any 
efforts to reform outcomes or assessment must contend with the strong 
iterative relationship between current teaching methods and current 
                                                            
74 KOHN, THE SCHOOLS OUR CHILDREN DESERVE, supra note 27, at 191–97. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 28. 
77 See id. at 164–66, 171–73, 182–83, 188–89; BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 206. 
78 CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18. 
79 See, e.g., John Valery White, The Pull of Rankings, NEVADA LAW., June 2009; Fine, 
supra note 5, at 730 nn. 66–67. 
80 See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. For further reading on reforming 
outcome measurements in legal education, see BEST PRACTICES, supra note 5, at 42–91; 
GREGORY S. MUNRO, OUTCOMES ASSESSMENT FOR LAW SCHOOLS (2000). The 
Carnegie Report renewed debate over whether current assessments adequately measure 
necessary lawyering skills. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18; Andrea A. Curcio, 
Assessing Differently and Using Empirical Studies to See if it Makes a Difference: Can 
Law Schools Do It Better?, 27 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 899, 902 (2009). Fueling the debate 
are considerations of student diversity and access, motivation and achievement, and the 
cache attached to U.S. News and World Report rankings, as well as logistical and 
financial resources. CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 62–64 (discussing potential 
costs of establishing an “outcome-oriented accreditation process”); Fine, supra note 5, at 
730–31 (discussing how rankings and costs have a negative effect on law school reform); 
Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Responding to Diverse Student Voices Helps all 
Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402, 402–04 (discussing issues of student diversity 
and access). 
81 Curcio, supra note 80, at 904 (“[I]n order to assess different skills, one must first teach 
those skills”). See also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 8 (“Law schools assess what 
they value.”). 
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assessment methods: the inadequacies of one perpetuate the inadequacies of 
the other.82 
Hence, the call for reform. Again. 
IV. AVOIDING THE FATE OF PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION 
One cannot understand the history of education in the United 
States in the twentieth century unless one realizes that . . . John 
Dewey lost.83 
Each of the CLEAR reform concepts—experiential learning, active 
learning, situated learning, differentiation, service learning, transformative 
education, collaborative learning, and interdisciplinary teaching—has 
important philosophical roots in progressive education. And yet, despite its 
compelling substance, progressive education failed to make a normative, 
long-term impact. Progressive education is currently marginalized and has 
never been mainstream.84 This result can be attributed to another failure: the 
failure to openly discuss and analyze a coherent strategy for the reform. In 
other words, progressive education failed because of an almost exclusive 
focus on substance, and no clear focus on strategy. 
To believers in progressive education, this is a disheartening result: 
something of tremendous value in extremely limited application. For 
supporters of legal education reform, we must consider whether we are 
nearing the same precipice. 
 
                                                            
82 Curcio, supra note 80, at 933. 
83 Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, The Plural Worlds of Educational Research, 29 HIST. OF 
EDUC. Q. 185, 185 (1989). 
84 Id.; SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW, supra note 1, at 20. 
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A. Challenges in Building a CLEAR Strategy: The Columbia Law School 
Experiment 
[T]he more complex the reform[,] . . . the greater the problem of 
clarity. In short, lack of clarity—diffuse goals and unspecified 
means of implementation—represents a major problem. . . . 
[T]eachers and others find that the change is simply not very clear 
as to what it means in practice.85 
Not only does the progressive education movement have much in 
common with contemporary legal education reform, but it was also admired 
by legal education reformers long ago. Indeed, today’s legal education 
could look very different but for a failed attempt to facilitate progressive 
education reform at Columbia Law School in the 1920s. In his book, 
Transforming Legal Education, Paul Maharg refers to Dewey’s influence 
on Columbia Law School as the “road not taken.”86 Columbia’s Dean, 
Harlan Fiske Stone, was a legal realist dissatisfied with common law 
tradition.87 Part of the problem, Stone believed, was that “[c]larity, as well 
as systematization, was a problem for lawyers—what he termed a lack of 
realistic understanding and of an accurate definition of many of its most 
fundamental concepts.”88 Stone was attracted to disciplinary reform, 
complaining that under the common law tradition legal “terms . . . 
constantly fall from our lips, but always with varying and elusive 
significance and application.”89 As a legal realist, Stone sought a new form 
of inquiry: one that rejected the legal formalism associated with the 
Langdellian case-based method of instruction and instead spotlighted the 
                                                            
85 FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 71. 
86 MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 77–98. 
87 Id. at 80. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. (quoting Harlan F. Stone, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF INFORMATION, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEAN OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW 327 (1923)). 
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connections between the law, social science, and human experience.90 But 
disciplinary reform would require curricular and pedagogical reform too, 
and Stone knew it.91 
In 1922, Stone invited Dewey to teach a course on Logical and Ethical 
Problems of Law at Columbia.92 Just a few months earlier, Professor 
Herman Oliphant, also a legal realist, joined Columbia’s faculty.93 The 
combination of these three scholars—Dewey, Stone, and Oliphant—was an 
unprecedented opportunity for systemic legal education reform. 94 
Maharg details how the trio shared many views on legal realism, the role 
of education, and the need for education reform.95 Deweyan theory and 
legal realism expressed similar political, philosophical, and social 
ideologies: Dewey’s “language [was] pragmatist—[it emphasized] new 
forms of enquiry, the language of progressive, evolutionary reform, the 
social ameliorism and underlying optimism; [and] an insistence upon the 
uncertainty of legal rules and their artificiality.”96 Legal realism generally 
resonated with Dewey’s beliefs. Legal realism also emphasized a pragmatic 
view of legal education and attacked “the generalist tendencies of 
individualistic, socialist and organic social philosophies.”97 
The political, philosophical, and social synergies between Dewey’s 
theories and legal realism extended to education reform as well. When 
Dewey arrived at Columbia, he was already well known for his critiques of 
traditional schooling methods as artificial, fragmented, and lacking a 
                                                            
90 Id. at 77–83. The Langdellian case-based method of instruction was developed by 
Harvard Law Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in the waning years of the nineteenth 
century.  
91 Id. at 80. 
92 Id. at 81. 
93 Herman Oliphant of Treasury Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1939, at 25 (noting that 
Oliphant joined Columbia in 1921). 
94 MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 77–96. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 82–83. 
97 Id. at 83 n.14. 
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meaningful relationship with society, experience, and the real world.98 This 
sentiment is echoed in Stone’s call for legal education reform: 
The curriculum of the American law school is in some respects a 
makeshift, the resultant of forces many of which bear little logical 
relation to each other. The exigencies of the personnel of the 
teaching staff, the form and scope of particular text or case books, 
the constant tendency manifest in most educational enterprises to 
multiply courses, the undue overlapping of courses and the failure 
of any school in recent years to make a systematic revision of its 
curriculum are some of the elements contributing to the failure of 
law school curricula to realize to the fullest extent the needs and 
tendencies of present day legal education.99 
Oliphant made similar observations, stressing the social, human, and 
holistic weaknesses of the traditional legal curriculum: 
[T]he feeling grows that students are going out only partly 
trained[,] for numerous specialized bodies of law are developing 
and we have not caught up by our tantalus-like addition of new 
courses. This suggests that in some of our so-called basic courses 
we have not got hold of some of those things which are really basic 
in the functioning of law with the result that this now hidden 
matter is constantly cropping out here and there as specialized and 
apparently unrelated problems. . . . It is believed that, if we are 
really to get at the fundamentals, the organization of the 
curriculum must be more in terms of the human relations dealt 
with and less, as largely now, in terms of the logical concepts of 
the conventionally trained mind.100 
                                                            
98 See supra Part IV(A). 
99 MAHARG, LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 18, at 78 n.3 (quoting Harlan F. Stone, 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY BULLETIN OF INFORMATION, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DEAN OF 
THE SCHOOL OF LAW (1922)). 
100 Id. at 88 (quoting Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum 
(1923), at 6). 
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Maharg establishes various other synergies between Stone, Oliphant, and 
Dewey that sparked Columbia’s reform effort.101 But the spark never caught 
flame. Instead, Oliphant and Stone devoted significant time and energy to a 
reform effort that amounted to the implementation of a few temporary, 
inconsistent “reformed courses.”102 Many reasons contributed to the 
failure,103 but chief among these was the lack of appreciation for strategy—
both in terms of teaching methodology and the coordination of the 
implementation of reform. Oliphant created careful plans to “outline the 
problems and the solutions to curricular reform, grouping them as ‘whom 
shall we teach, how shall we teach, and what shall we teach?’”104 But in 
practice, the effort “had the effect of shifting the attention of faculty 
reformers from functionalist and pragmatic methodology (how they were 
going to achieve their goal) and led to a concern with empiricism (what they 
would teach to achieve their goal).”105 In other words, the question of what 
should be taught eclipsed the question of how these new courses should be 
taught. In his exhaustive review of the Columbia experiment, Maharg notes 
that “nowhere do we find at Columbia a detailed discussion of educational 
method.”106 He concludes the faculty and administration needed to “give 
much more thought to classroom practice and to the definition and 
implementation of realist educational principles.”107 Although Stone’s 
writings reveal “deep thought [about] the redesign of the curriculum,”108 
they also reveal a lack of clarity about how to implement these changes.109 
                                                            
101 Id. at 77–96. 
102 Id. at 89. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 87 (quoting Herman Oliphant, The Revision of the Law School Curriculum 
(1923), at 1). 
105 Id. at 90. 
106 Id. at 89. 
107 Id. at 92. 
108 Id. at 80. 
109 Id. at 90–91. 
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Even if one assumes complete faculty buy-in for the content of the reformed 
curriculum, Maharg’s review shows the Columbia reformers did not have a 
clear, shared understanding of how to translate the substantive concepts into 
practice. 
Legal realism was a philosophy that needed grounding in established 
pedagogical theories and practice. Without a clear, shared definition of the 
substantive terms of reform, and without a clear strategy and consistent 
guidance for implementing these terms, Dewey’s theories were too 
challenging to translate into practice. Indeed, “Dewey’s approach allowed 
others to flourish by giving them the space to flesh out the Deweyan 
structure; but it was a weakness for a general strategy of legal education 
which is what the realist endeavor desperately needed.”110 
Like many education reform efforts, Columbia’s effort stalled in large 
part from a failure to ensure clear, common understanding of the terms or 
strategy for reform. Today, Columbia, like the vast majority of American 
law schools over the last 140 years, primarily relies upon traditional 
methods of teaching law. 
The Columbia experiment illustrates the consequences of 
underestimating the process of transforming legal education. It exposes a 
lacuna between solid theories and successful, systematic implementation: a 
black hole that devours the best intentions. To avoid a similar outcome, 
advocates must add a new dimension to the discussion about legal education 
reform by focusing on building a coherent strategy. As explained below, 
this focus requires advocates to become metacognitive about the reform 
process and covers at least three ideas: 
1. Consider whether current reform efforts can form the basis of a 
feasible movement. Is there, or could there be, sufficient 
coherence of interest among potential advocates for reform? 
                                                            
110 Id. at 95. 
36 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM 
What opportunities exist, or could exist, for potential members 
to identify each other and coalesce around a shared vision for 
reform? What opportunities exist, or could exist, for recruitment 
and education of members? Real change is a systemic process111 
that requires deliberate organization and collective action, so 
these considerations have important strategic implications. 
2. Determine what language best defines the reform. If a critical 
mass of membership can be identified, do these members share a 
vocabulary? If so, what are the key terms and how are these 
terms communicated? Does this shared language center around 
loose abstractions or does it engage terms with common and 
concrete meaning? Defining a shared language is a prerequisite 
to reform.112 
3. Articulate an action plan. What is the agenda for the reform? 
Are there plans that incorporate strategies at the individual 
level? The institutional level? Regional or national levels? The 
scope of the action plan necessarily limits the potential scope of 
implementation. Without a coherent plan for implementation, 
good ideas generally stay good ideas. Action plans increase the 
likelihood that good ideas evolve into actual practices; systemic 
action plans increase the likelihood of realizing systemic 
transformation. 
1. The Challenge of Discerning a CLEAR Movement 
How can one tell if CLEAR provides the basis for a movement? 
Common characteristics distinguish a movement from coincidental or 
                                                            
111 See, e.g., BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 14; FULLAN, 
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at xiii; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER 
SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at xvii, 16. 
112 See generally, FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4. 
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symbiotic activities.113 Generally, a movement entails: (1) a broad category 
of people who share certain fundamental beliefs of reform;114 (2) sufficient 
coherence115 that members can identify one another as members of an 
ideological family;116 (3) deliberate, self-conscious combination and action 
among members117 (4) that results in an advantage of organization, enabling 
a movement to lobby and build its constituency;118 and (5) direction of this 
collective effort to ensure the long-term impact of the reform.119 Illustrative 
examples include the women’s suffrage movement and the civil rights 
movement.120  
Not every group interest or activity qualifies as a movement. Although 
various individuals may come together to support a certain reform, they 
may be prompted by “opportunistic” moments or “improvisation,” as 
opposed to a shared, “consistent social vision or political program.”121 Peter 
Filene, a twentieth century historian, refers to these collective but sporadic 
or fragmented efforts as “shifting coalitions.”122 
Educational policy scholar Herbert Kliebard offers vocational training as 
an example of a shifting coalition.123 He notes that various reformers joined 
forces to support the institution of vocational training, but that they came 
together for different reasons.124 Some came because they believed in 
                                                            
113 See Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement,’ 22 AM. Q. 20, 32–
34 (1970); KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 280–83. 
114 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 283. 
115 Filene, supra note 113, at 27. 
116 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 284. 
117 Filene, supra note 113, at 21. 
118 Rodgers, supra note 25, at 121. 
119 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 280. 
120 Id. at 284. 
121 Id. at 280–81 (citing Peter G. Filene, An Obituary for ‘The Progressive Movement,’ 22 
AM. Q. 20, 33–34 (1970)). 
122 Filene, supra note 113, at 33–34. 
123 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 282. 
124 Id. 
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“preserving the dignity of work in school programs.”125 Some came because 
they “despair[ed]” there was no other way to handle a new, diverse student 
body than to provide “a highly differentiated curriculum.”126 Others 
supported vocational training because they believed it “dissolve[d] artificial 
barriers” between school and the real world.127 Although different reformers 
coalesced on this one issue, they were completely opposed on other 
fundamental matters of education reform.128 
One can debate whether the institution of vocational training was a 
success. But Dewey’s theories required a more ambitious transformation of 
American education, which could only be realized by organizational 
support on the scale of a movement. Instead, a lack of structure and strategy 
brought progressive education to its knees.129 
Historians Daniel Rodgers and Peter Filene have examined the 
progressive era and reject the notion of a coherent progressive identity. 
Rodgers reflects on the “Procrustean exercise of trying to stretch those who 
called themselves progressives over a single ideological frame. . . . [This 
exercise produces] a list of ideas so general as to be held by practically 
everyone or so ambiguous, and even contradictory, as to foreclose the 
possibility that members of the same movement could hold them 
simultaneously.”130 Filene similarly rejects singular definitions of 
progressivism as “hover[ing] between paradox and meaninglessness . . . 
struggling desperately to fit [a] concept onto data that stubbornly spill over 
the edges of that concept.”131 He observes that such definitional “logic [is] 





128 Id. at 271–91. 
129 Id. See also Filene, supra note 113, at 33–34; Kohn, Progressive Education, supra 
note 21, at 4; Rodgers, supra note 25, at 115–16. 
130 Rodgers, supra note 25, at 114. 
131 Filene, supra note 113, at 32. 
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themselves felt a common identity and acted as a collective body.”132 As a 
result, Rodgers and Filene conclude that whatever one might call “the 
progressive era” did not amount to a coherent, lasting identity. 
Do contemporary legal education reform efforts resemble a “shifting 
coalition” doomed to a limited or diffuse impact? Arguably, those of us who 
support the transformation of legal education are too disorganized to secure 
systemic progress.133 Many of us resort to innovation in the privacy of our 
own classrooms and accept the institutional consequences of operating on 
the fringes of academia.134 We must better educate ourselves about the 
process of change and take seriously the task of deliberate combination, 
organization, and strategic action. To be sure, this is no easy task. But to 
have any realistic shot at strategic progress, we must also speak the same 
language. 
2. The Challenge of CLEAR Communication and Action 
[I]f ideas are to move action, they must be made accessible to 
those who will be called on to use them.135 
Acting on change is an exercise in pursuing meaning.136 
Clear, shared terms are necessary for the development of group identity, 
goals, strategic plans, and ultimately, collective action.137 Consistent use of 
specific language permits members of an ideological group to identify each 
other, to communicate, and “to secure political allegiances . . . on behalf of 
                                                            
132 Id. 
133 See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
134 See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, They Published, Not Perished, But Were They Good 
Teachers?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 835 (1998) (discussing how current criteria for 
promotion and tenure marginalize good teachers). 
135 SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at xiv. 
136 FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 351. 
137 Id. at 62; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 100–17. 
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a specific reform.”138 In this sense, language is branded and serves as a sort 
of “ideational glue” 139 or slogan system.140 
But if language is to create meaningful coherence, it needs to be defined 
beyond the abstraction of slogans and catch phrases. Consider the popular 
term “student-centered.” As a law professor, I use this term all the time and 
I have my own conception of what “student-centered” means. It is used in a 
wide range of legal education materials, journals, law school mission 
statements, and publicity materials. But I have used the phrase enough to 
discover that “student-centered” means such a wide range of things to 
others that I have become concerned that this phrase has no concrete 
definition at all.141 
Like slogans, reform rhetoric often has an elusive or elastic quality. 
Popular reform phrases, like “democracy,” are virtually impossible to reject 
but even harder to define. Rodgers makes this observation of progressivist 
terminology, tackling one popular phrase as an example: social justice. 
“‘Social justice’ is a case in point—a powerful Rooseveltian slogan in 1912 
which, in the absence of anyone willing to defend ‘social injustice,’ worked 
its magic in large part through its half-buried innuendoes and its expansive 
indistinctiveness.”142 Slippery and ephemeral, reform rhetoric sounds great, 
but lack real content that can be translated into action. 
A fundamental problem with reform rhetoric is that it often becomes a 
distraction from action—a sort of academic narcotic. Educators talk about 
change, and talking makes us feel good—like we are actually doing 
something. To some extent, this is true: it is necessary to discuss goals, 
                                                            
138 KLIEBARD, supra note 2, at 286. See also Rodgers, supra note 25. 
139 Rodgers, supra note 25, at 121. 
140 BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 153–54. 
141 Cf. Rodgers, supra note 25, at 113–15 (describing historians’ efforts to define 
“progressivism”) (“[T]he conflicting interpretations of progressivism could not be made 
to add up.”). 
142 Id. at 122. 
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missions, and plans.143 Discussion can open the door to strategic solutions. 
But unless we forge a clear bridge from discussion to action, then 
discussion is not a means to a solution. To the contrary, the attempted 
solution becomes the problem.144 Rhetoric instills a sense of “false clarity 
[that] occurs when change is interpreted in an oversimplified way.”145 As a 
result, “people think that they have changed but have only assimilated the 
superficial trappings of the new practice.”146 
At this point, rhetoric masquerades as progress but instead inhibits it. 
Organizational change expert Michael Fullan refers to a similar 
phenomenon as the “pacifier effect.”147 He describes most reform efforts as 
having “a pacifier effect because they give the appearance that something 
substantial is happening when it is not.”148 Rhetoric is such a pacifier, 
giving the illusion of action. Even at its best, rhetoric prescribes general and 
abstract goals, resulting in “nonchange.”149 
Reform rhetoric is distinct from substantive discussion about reform. 
Substantive discussion is based on data, information, and education; it 
involves collective and sustained effort; it develops commonly understood 
goals and strategies; it offers meaningful guidance on implementation and 
                                                            
143 SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 60–76; FULLAN, 
EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 71. 
144 PAUL WATZLAWICK, JOHN WEAKLAND & RICHARD FISCH, CHANGE: PRINCIPLES OF 
PROBLEM FORMATION AND PROBLEM RESOLUTION 57 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 1974). 
This phenomenon calls to mind the proverb, “The greatest talkers are always the least 
doers” (John Ray, English Proverbs, 1670). 
145 FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 70. 
146 Id. at 35. 
147 Id. at 352. 
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practice; and it provides ongoing assessment and support.150 Ultimately, 
substantive discussion spurs action.151 
Of course, substantive discussion is far more difficult than rhetoric. That 
is why so many of us opt for rhetoric, settling for “the quick fix and . . . ad 
hoc, small-scale, piecemeal innovations.”152 In the context of education 
reform, this posture is not a compromise; it is a total surrender. If we 
continue to pay “more lip service than mind service”153 to the 
transformation of legal education, we cannot expect real change. 
Advocates must critically examine the language we use for contemporary 
legal education reform. We must move beyond platitudes and articulate 
specific and comprehensible terms. We must define clear and replicable 
strategies. At this relatively early stage in the evolution of legal education 
reform, advocates should not promote elusive concepts that are neither 
coherently defined by those who support them, nor comprehensible to those 
who remain to be convinced. We must articulate a clear campaign for the 
transformation of legal education. 
V. SHIFTING THE FOCUS FROM SUBSTANCE TO STRATEGY 
If we are not careful we can easily witness a series of non-events 
and other superficial changes that leave the core of the problem 
untouched.154 
So where can legal education reform advocates start? How can we begin 
to adopt a more strategic perspective for changing legal education? A 
                                                            
150 Id. at 80–90. See also BURKE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT, supra note 18, at 55–
65; SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 134–38, 164–66. 
151 SCHLECHTY, INVENTING BETTER SCHOOLS, supra note 18, at 76 (“The important 
thing is . . . to cause the conversation to occur and to act upon what emerges.”). 
152 FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 6. 
153 Id. at 11. 
154 Id. at xiii. 
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comprehensive answer is beyond the scope of this article, but a few starting 
points are suggested below.  
A. Challenge Ourselves and Our Colleagues 
Advocates can start with some honest self-assessment. Consider the 
following questions: 
 How much do I and my colleagues really understand about 
current efforts to reform legal education? 
 What do I/we know about the arguments for reforming legal 
education? 
 What are the bases for these arguments? 
 What specific terms of reform have been or should be embraced 
by my institution? 
 Do my colleagues and my administration share a common 
understanding of these terms? If not, what institutional support 
exists to facilitate a common understanding? 
 Is my administration committed to providing ongoing training or 
education to support innovation? 
 What specific pedagogical and curricular modifications can I/we 
make to reflect contemporary knowledge about teaching and 
learning? 
 How will I/we measure progress in meeting these reform 
objectives? 
After reflecting on these questions, ask yourself: Do I feel like I could 
facilitate a substantive discussion about the transformation of legal 
education? Could many of my colleagues do so? Most of us cannot honestly 
answer either question in the affirmative. To those of you who can, ask 
yourself what you are doing to facilitate and maintain substantive 
discussion at your law school. Whatever you are doing, do more. Advocates 
must press our colleagues to consider these questions and join us in the 
quest to find substantive answers. 
44 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM 
B. Become Educated About the Process of Change 
Legal education reform promises to be a complex journey. If we educate 
ourselves about the process of change, we will be better prepared to plan, 
implement, and evaluate reform. A bevy of expertise in organizational 
change already exists, particularly in the public education context.155 While 
                                                            
155 See supra, Part IV(A)(2). See also FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 
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law schools differ from these contexts, many principles of organizational 
change theory are applicable to reform efforts in legal education. Therefore, 
law schools interested in education reform should secure a means for the 
administration and faculty to receive substantive (and, ideally, coordinated) 
training in organizational change theory. 
The unique challenges of change in the law school context call for the 
development of new organizational change studies focused on legal 
academia. Some legal scholars already possess experience in organizational 
change theory and should redouble their focus on developing specific 
primers, training programs, and other resources to assist law schools in 
becoming educated about the process of change. 
C. Organize at Institutional, Regional, and National Levels 
Current reform efforts are piecemeal and fragmented.156 To facilitate 
systemic change, we must strive to build functioning coalitions at the 
institutional, regional, and national levels. This requires a shift from insular 
thinking about the substance of education reform to strategic thinking about 
coordinated, collective discussion and action. 
There are several ways to coordinate our efforts. For example, law 
schools interested in reform could appoint one or more individuals as 
delegates to coordinate change efforts at institutional and national levels.157 
The formal designation of delegates streamlines responsibility and creates 
accountability. Current leaders in legal education reform could facilitate the 
assembly of regional and national teams of delegates, who are tasked with 
                                                            
(2003); Andy Hargreaves, Representing Educational Change, 1 J. OF EDUC. CHANGE 3 
(2000); William J. Hunter & Garth D. Benson, Arrows in Time: The Misapplication of 
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156 See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text. 
157 My colleague, Paula Lustbader, has observed that law schools commonly charge an 
Associate Dean with facilitating faculty scholarship, but currently, no corollary exists for 
an administrator to facilitate innovation in curriculum and pedagogy. 
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creating and coordinating substantive discussion about legal education 
reform. In the spirit of representation, these delegates could be responsible 
not only for developing expertise in substantive and strategic considerations 
for legal education reform, but also for making recommendations and 
facilitating implementation of reform plans. 
National organizations and associations, such as the Society for 
American Law Teachers (SALT) and the American Association of Law 
Schools (AALS), can also employ their resources to facilitate the collective 
organization of reform efforts—from the individual to the national level. 
SALT’s recent conference, “Teaching in a Transformative Era: The Law 
School of the Future,” is just one example of the coordinated venues that 
could advance discussion and planning around the strategic and systemic 
challenges of effecting change.158 
VI. CLEARING THE WAY FOR THE TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL 
EDUCATION  
Armed with knowledge of the change process, and a commitment 
to action, we should accept nothing less than positive results on a 
massive scale—at both the individual and organizational levels.159 
Education reform experts routinely identify the definition of shared goals, 
commonly understood strategies, and measurable outcomes as predictors of 
successful education reform.160 Despite the support of cognitive science and 
learning theory, progressive education never successfully incorporated these 
predictors into a coherent, collective structure or strategy. As a result, 
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progressive education still lingers on the fringes of the academic world, 
enjoying only occasional (but fleeting and limited) revivals. The Carnegie 
Report has temporarily revived interest in many progressive theories and 
practices in legal education—but so far, legal education reform efforts 
exhibit the same symptoms that have quashed precedential efforts. 
While some of us are trying our hand at the transformation of legal 
education, ,we collectively continue to underestimate the task.161 The status 
quo is a relentless adversary that enjoys almost every strategic advantage. It 
will refuse to go down easily. We cannot arm ourselves simply by writing 
more articles or attending more conferences. We must become more 
metacognitive about the process of reform.162 We must organize, define 
concrete terms, articulate clear strategies, develop and implement plans to 
validate the impact of these strategies, lobby at the highest levels, and 
continue to build our constituency until we prevail. The transformation of 
legal education is an epic battle. We must be prepared to fight—or to lose. 
 
                                                            
161 FULLAN, EDUCATIONAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 29 (“We have our work cut out for 
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